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Abstract
Leibniz Equivalence is a principle of applied mathematics that is widely assumed 
in both general relativity textbooks and in the philosophical literature on Einstein’s 
hole argument. In this article, I clarify an ambiguity in the statement of this Leib-
niz Equivalence, and argue that the relevant expression of it for the hole argument 
is strictly false. I then show that the hole argument still succeeds as a refutation 
of manifold substantivalism; however, recent proposals that the hole argument is 
undermined by principles of representational equivalence do not fare so well.
Keywords General relativity · Spacetime · Substantivalism · Relationism · Leibniz 
equivalence · Hole argument
1 Introduction
When using mathematical language to represent the physical world, it is tempting 
to develop principles for how to do it well. One such principle is what philosophers 
of physics call ‘Leibniz Equivalence’, which gives the plausible advice that, if two 
mathematical structures are isomorphic, then they can both be used to accurately 
represent the same physical situation.
Earman and Norton [6] formulated and named Leibniz Equivalence in the anal-
ysis of spacetime substantivalism and Einstein’s hole argument. Since then Leib-
niz Equivalence has received a great deal of support, especially when the notion 
of isomorphism is given by the ‘diffeomorphism freedom’ of general relativity. For 
example, Brighouse writes that relationists about spacetime, “will hold that Leib-
niz equivalence is sufficient for physical equivalence” [3, p. 118]. Saunders gives a 
statement of Leibniz Equivalence very similar to the one above, and argues that the 
thesis “applies equally to any symmetry of a physical theory, when applied to the 
world as a whole, and to any transformation that can be only intrinsically defined” 
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[26, p. 301]. Pooley describes “a family of responses to the spacetime version of the 
hole argument, namely those which, one way or another, claim that all diffeomor-
phic spacetime models represent exactly the same physical state of affairs, a position 
well-known in the literature as Leibniz Equivalence” [20, p. 375]. More recently, 
Weatherall claims that, “the moral of the hole argument is supposed to be that one 
must accept that diffeomorphic models represent the same physical situation” [27, p. 
343]. And there are many more comments like this.
In this article I will examine this seemingly plausible principle more closely—
and show a subtle sense in which it is false. Philosophers of physics will recog-
nise this conclusion as potentially relevant to the spacetime substantivalism debate, 
where Leibniz Equivalence has been purported to do real philosophical work. I will 
argue on the contrary that Leibniz Equivalence is not so relevant to the substantival-
ism debate after all.
I begin in Sect. 2 by clarifying an ambiguity between two interpretations of Leib-
niz Equivalence, at least as it was originally baptised in Earman and Norton’s analy-
sis of spacetime substantivalism and the hole argument. Only one of them is actually 
relevant for the substantivalism debate, and it is this principle that I will argue is 
strictly false in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 I show that this result turns out to have little effect 
on Einstein’s hole argument. Rather, it shows that the hole argument is not so much 
a reductio of Leibniz Equivalence denial, as it is of manifold substantivalism in a 
more direct sense. Section 5 gives a critical discussion of recent work by Weatherall 
[27] suggesting that the hole argument depends on a misleading use mathematics. 
Section 6 is the conclusion.
2  Two Forms of Leibniz Equivalence
2.1  Weak and Strong Leibniz Equivalence
In a famous challenge to Clarke, Leibniz wrote that it would make no difference to 
transform a description of the universe by “changing east into west”.1 He took this to 
bode poorly for the spacetime substantivalism of Newton and Clarke: if the only dif-
ference to be found is in “the chimerical supposition of the reality of space in itself”, 
then all the worse for the reality of space!
Leibniz’s challenge can be formulated a little more powerfully in terms of the 
principle known as Leibniz Equivalence. The rough idea is that, insofar as spatially 
‘flipped’ mathematical descriptions are isomorphic, Leibniz Equivalence implies 
that both provide equally accurate ways to represent the physical universe. If spa-
cetime were a real entity, then there would seemingly be a distinction between these 
two descriptions. Leibniz Equivalence thus seems to provide a reason to reject the 
reality of spacetime. Can this argument be made in the more rigorous language of 
modern physics? The answer depends on how one interprets an ambiguity in the 
expression of Leibniz Equivalence.
1 See Leibniz’s third letter to Clarke, §5 [16, p. 14].
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Let me begin with a somewhat informal discussion of two things ‘Leibniz Equiv-
alence’ could mean, deferring a more precise technical discussion in spacetime 
physics for the next subsection. When one states that isomorphic structures can both 
be used to represent a physical situation accurately, does that mean that they can do 
so ‘at once’, in the sense of relating to the world through the same concrete inter-
pretation? Or not necessarily?2 The former might be said to express that two struc-
tures have ‘co-representational capacity’, whereas the latter expresses that they have 
‘equal representational capacity’3. Since the latter is a logically weaker statement, 
I’ll refer to it as ‘Weak’ Leibniz Equivalence.
Definition 1 (Weak Leibniz Equivalence) Isomorphic mathematical structures can 
each be used with equal accuracy to represent a given physical situation (though not 
necessarily at once).
Example New Yorkers usually describe a set of locations on one side of Man-
hattan as ‘East’ and those on the other side as ‘West’ (‘Not East’). But we could 
describe the same locations with those labels reversed. The two descriptions are iso-
morphic, and each one provides an accurate way to represent locations in Manhat-
tan, just as Weak Leibniz Equivalence would have it. Of course, we cannot consist-
ently use both in the same concrete interpretation without generating contradictions 
of multiple denotation, like: ‘The New York Public Library is located on the East 
side and on the West side (not on the East side)’.4 But, Weak Leibniz Equivalence is 
still satisfied, because it does not require the two descriptions to represent the same 
thing at once.
Regardless of its plausibility, Weak Leibniz Equivalence provides little help in 
formulating Leibniz’s challenge to Clarke. A description of the universe, like a 
description of Manhattan, can be reversed East-to-West. But this does not prevent 
one from being a substantivalist, who would just view this as a relabelling of the 
real spacetime events! That the two isomorphic descriptions ‘can’ both be used to 
accurately represent spacetime does not by itself contradict the reality in spacetime.
In contrast, a logically stronger reading of Leibniz Equivalence may do some 
work for Leibniz’s argument:
Definition 2 (Strong Leibniz Equivalence) Isomorphic mathematical structures can 
all be used with equal accuracy to represent a given physical situation, at once.
2 This ambiguity is briefly discussed by Gryb and Thébault [10] in reference to Weatherall [27] and in 
an earlier version of this paper [22].
3 The concept of a ‘representational capacity’ was applied to human cognition at least as early as Kant’s 
Critique of Cure Reason (B72), and has been recently adopted by philosophers of scientific representa-
tion [c.f. 28, 30]. It was helpfully introduced into the hole argument literature by Weatherall [27].
4 Goodman [9, §II,3] interprets art as capable of multiple denotation, and Priest [21] has analysed it 
in the context of paraconsistent logic. I am not aware of any response to Leibniz’s challenge on these 
grounds.
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If one adopts Strong Leibniz Equivalence, then isomorphic descriptions of Man-
hattan, spacetime, or anything else can be used to equally represent a given physical 
situation at once, in the same concrete interpretation. So, what of the paradoxes of 
multiple denotation? In both the Manhattan example and Leibniz’s description of 
the universe, there are two ways to avoid the problem: 
1. Deny that the two descriptions are isomorphic: one or the other might be accurate, 
but they are not isomorphic to each other; or
2. Deny that either description is accurate: neither accurately captures the facts.
In the Manhattan example, one might want to deny the isomorphism. For example, 
the sentence, ‘Cars drive on the East side of a North-South street’ is correct on one 
labelling of East-West and not on the other. But, if two descriptions really are iso-
morphic, then Strong Leibniz Equivalence implies that neither accurately captures 
the facts. This is the conclusion of the Leibniz argument about spacetime: state-
ments about location in spacetime that are independent of the material it contains 
cannot be accurate. Reject such statements and the contradictions of multiple deno-
tation go away.
One could go back and forth for some time about how to react to these infor-
mal examples. Things get more interesting when we eliminate those ambiguities 
and adopt a more mathematically practice language. So, let us now turn to Leibniz 
Equivalence in the context of modern spacetime physics.
2.2  Leibniz Equivalence in Spacetime Physics
Leibniz Equivalence was originally defined as a statement about representation in 
the context of general relativity. So, I will begin with a brief discussion of what it 
means for a model of general relativity to represent the world, through what Curiel 
[5] has called a ‘concrete interpretation’. I then turn to clarifying the definition of 
Leibniz Equivalence in spacetime physics.
2.2.1  Concrete Interpretations
A model of general relativity is a linguistic structure that one can use to represent 
the world. I will assume this structure has the form of a Lorentzian manifold: each 
model is a pair (M, gab) , where M is a smooth, connected, 4-dimensional manifold 
and gab is a smooth metric field of Lorentz signature (1, 3). Matter-energy is rep-
resented by an additional stress-energy field T
ab
 , but this can be uniquely recon-
structed from gab using Einstein’s equations. Other test-fields (which contribute neg-
ligibly to stress-energy) may be separately included as well. But for this discussion, 
no generality is lost in taking a model to be a simple pair (M, gab) . Lorentzian mani-
folds come with a built-in standard of isomorphism, known as an ‘isometry’: we say 
that (M, gab) and (M̃, g̃ab) are isometric if and only if there exists a diffeomorphism 
𝜓 ∶ M → M̃ such that the pullback of 휓 preserves metric, in that 𝜓∗gab = g̃ab.
1 3
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When a Lorentzian manifold (M, gab) is used to represent the world in a concrete 
way, Curiel [5, §2] calls it a concrete interpretation in the spirit of model theory. 
That is, an interpretation can give truth to a sentence like, ‘He is killing all of them.’ 
For example, Hodges [13] charmingly gave that sentence the interpretation, “that 
‘he’ is Alfonso Arblaster of 35 The Crescent, Beetleford, and that ‘them’ are the 
pigeons in his loft”. Less violently, in general relativity, Curiel refers to them as 
“e.g., the fixation of a Tarskian family of models, or, less formally, the contents 
of a good, comprehensive text-book” [5]. For example, an interpretation can give 
(approximate) truth to a sentence like, ‘The galaxy contains a Schwarzschild black 
hole (M, gab) of roughly 5 × 10
6 solar masses’. To make this sentence true, let 
(M, gab) be concretely interpreted to represent the region around the black hole at 
the centre of our galaxy. This is of course not the only concrete interpretation5 of 
the (Schwarzschild) Lorentzian manifold (M, gab) . For example: the same linguistic 
structure could be used to represent the (comparably large) black hole at the centre 
of Messier 61 with reasonable accuracy. For the purposes of this article, what is 
most relevant about the example is that we cannot use (M, gab) to represent both 
the centre of our galaxy and Messier 61 ‘at once’—meaning, ‘in the same concrete 
interpretation’—on pain of contradictions of multiple denotation.
This is what I will mean by a ‘representation’ in the discussion to follow: an 
interpretation of (linguistic) sentences involving (M, gab) in terms of (physical) facts 
about the world that makes those sentences at least approximately true. And when I 
say that two linguistic structures can or cannot represent the same thing ‘at once’, I 
will mean this in the sense of being part of the same concrete interpretation. This is 
entirely standard practice: it is exactly what one finds in a typical general relativity 
textbook, and it is a standard way of thinking in both philosophy and physics. But 
it is worth being clear about this when we turn to characterising putative ‘rules’ for 
representation like Leibniz Equivalence.
2.2.2  Leibniz Equivalence in Spacetime Physics
When Earman and Norton originally defined ‘Leibniz Equivalence’ in the context of 
spacetime physics, they wrote:
“Leibniz Equivalence   Diffeomorphic models represent the same physical sit-
uation”
[6, p. 522]. Their phrase “diffeomorphic models” should be understood in our lan-
guage to mean, “isometric Lorentzian manifolds”. But their statement that two such 
models “represent the same physical situation” introduces the ambiguity we have 
discussed above.
Let me first head off a possible confusion: although a natural reading of Earman 
and Norton’s words would be that isometric Lorentzian manifolds ‘do’ or ‘must’ 
represent the same physical situation, this would lead to a principle that is totally 
implausible. For example, two isometric Lorentzian manifolds (M, gab) and (M̃, g̃ab) 
5 This is pointed out by Roberts [22] and by Fletcher [8, § 3.2]
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may both be isometric to the Schwarzschild solution but, as we saw above, these 
linguistic structures can still be used to represent different physical situations. This 
isn’t particularly interesting, and it isn’t what Earman and Norton had in mind.
What they more likely meant is that isometric models ‘can’ represent the same 
thing. But, this usage introduces an ambiguity, between the ‘Weak’ and ‘Strong’ 
readings of Leibniz Equivalence. That is, their statement could either mean:
– Weak Leibniz Equivalence Isometric Lorentzian manifolds can each be used with 
equal accuracy to represent a given physical situation (though not necessarily at 
once); or
– Strong Leibniz Equivalence: Isometric Lorentzian manifolds can all be used with 
equal accuracy to represent a given physical situation, at once.
Weak Leibniz Equivalence is irrelevant for the substantivalist debate: a substantival-
ist has no problem accepting that isometric descriptions can be used to describe the 
same physical situation in some contexts; they are mere alternative labellings for the 
same ‘real’ spacetime points.
In contrast, Strong Leibniz Equivalence is relevant to the substantivalism debate. 
Further confirmation of this reading can be found in the textbooks that Earman and 
Norton refer to in support of their definition, where the term “model” is used to indi-
cate representation via a concrete interpretation: “the model for space-time is not 
just one pair (M, g) but a whole equivalence class of all pairs (M�, g�) which are [iso-
metrically] equivalent to (M, g)” [11, p. 56]; and, “relativistic models are regarded 
as defined only up to isomorphism” [25]. More importantly, as we will see in the 
next section, only Strong Leibniz Equivalence allows for the Leibniz-inspired argu-
ment against substantivalism known as the ‘hole argument’.
So, except where I specify otherwise, I will drop the ‘Strong’ prefix, and use the 
phrase ‘Leibniz Equivalence’ as shorthand for ‘Strong Leibniz Equivalence’:
Definition 3 (Leibniz Equivalence) Any pair of isometric Lorentzian manifolds 
(M, gab) and (M̃, g̃ab) can be concretely interpreted to represent the same physical 
situation at once.
I will also sometimes have occasion to refer to its logical negation:
Definition 4 (Leibniz Equivalence Denial) A pair of isometric Lorentzian manifolds 
(M, gab) and (M̃, g̃ab) exist that cannot be concretely interpreted to represent the same 
physical situation at once.
3  Leibniz Equivalence Fails
Only Leibniz Equivalence in the ‘Strong’ sense is relevant for the hole argument. 
But, in spite of the textbooks, and in spite of the common wisdom about diffeomor-
phism freedom in general relativity, Leibniz Equivalence (in the ‘Strong’ sense) is 
1 3
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false. There are situations in which Leibniz Equivalence can reasonably fail, inde-
pendently of anything to do with substantivalism.
Here is a counterexample to show this. Consider the open half-plane 
M = ℝ × (0,+∞) with a metric field gab that is the same at every point. The half-
plane is infinite to the West, East and North, but finite to the South where there is an 
open boundary. This is a perfectly legitimate Lorentzian manifold, and even useful 
for modelling purposes. So, it can be concretely interpreted to represent some physi-
cal situation. If Strong Leibniz Equivalence were true, or if Hawking and Ellis [11, 
p. 56] were right, then all Lorentzian manifolds isometric to it could accurately rep-
resent the same physical situation at once.
But it isn’t true.6 This Lorentzian manifold is isometric to a proper subset of 
itself: translate the half-plane ‘up’ into itself by an arbitrary amount and the result 
is an isometry, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Call the image of that isometry (M̃, g̃ab) . It is 
a ‘proper part’ of the original half-plane, in the sense of being defined by a restric-
tion to a proper subset (a ‘Lorentzian submanifold’). So, it only represents a ‘part’ 
of the physical situation that the original half-plane represents. In most modelling 
scenarios, a ‘whole’ and its ‘proper part’ are not the same physical situation. So long 
as this is the case, the half-plane leads to the denial of Leibniz Equivalence: this pair 
of isometric Lorentzian manifolds cannot be concretely interpreted to represent the 
same physical situation at once.
The property leading to Leibniz Equivalence denial here can be formulated as a 
general principle, if one were in the business of proposing principles for good scien-
tific representation (I am not):
Definition 5 (The Principle of Composition) A (‘whole’) Lorentzian manifold and 
one of its proper (‘part’) Lorentzian submanifolds cannot represent the same physi-
cal situation at once.
ψs
Fig. 1  Isometric embedding into a proper subset
6 Norton [18, §10.3.2] is well-aware of the failure of Leibniz Equivalence in general, although I think 
the example of this section makes it particularly perspicuous.
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Rather than advocate any such general principle, I would like to point out that the 
half-plane is a perfectly legitimate model of general relativity, which can be used 
to represent physical situations for which the whole is different from any proper 
part. As a result, Leibniz Equivalence fails under reasonable circumstances. No 
assumption about spacetime substantivalism is needed to make this point: whether 
one chooses to interpret the manifold as a relationist or as a substantivalist, Leibniz 
Equivalence fails here.
Of course, it is possible to avoid this kind of counterexample with a little quali-
fication. That is, it is still possible to say: the half-plane (M, gab) and its (isometric) 
Lorentzian submanifold (M̃, g̃ab) can represent the same physical situation at once, 
insofar as we ignore that one is a proper subset of the other. I will discuss this kind 
of response in more detail in Sect. 5. But in general, it is up to the applied math-
ematician whether these subset relations are ignored. Thus, our lesson is really: the 
success or failure of Leibniz Equivalence depends entirely on how we happen to use 
language to represent the physical world. Nothing about the representation described 
above is unreasonable from the perspective of applied mathematics; the requirement 
of (Strong) Leibniz Equivalence, on the other hand, is questionable.
4  The Hole Argument Revisited
Einstein grappled with the hole argument in his preliminary writing on general rela-
tivity, but it was Earman and Norton [6] who identified its significance for the sub-
stantivalism debate. In this section I will first review their discussion of manifold 
substantivalism, and clarify its definition. I will then review the hole argument, and 
point out that its target is not so much Leibniz Equivalence denial, but a particular 
definition of manifold substantivalism.
4.1  Defining Manifold Substantivalism
Earman and Norton [6, p. 522] call the denial of Leibniz Equivalence the ‘acid test’ 
for substantivalists. But we have just seen that Leibniz Equivalence fails, indepen-
dently of anything to do with substantivalism. How are we to interpret this result? A 
careful review of Earman and Norton will find that Leibniz Equivalence is not really 
the issue; the target is a more direct expression of manifold substantivalism.
Earman and Norton’s discussion of spacetime substantivalism is inspired by the 
Leibniz and Clarke correspondence. They say:
[i]f everything in the world were reflected East to West (or better, translated 3 
feet East), retaining all the relations between bodies, would we have a different 
world? The substantivalist must answer yes since all the bodies of the world 
are now in different spatial locations, even though the relations between them 
are unchanged. [6, p. 521].
For example: fix a concrete interpretation in which (M, gab) accurately represents a 
physical situation—say, spacetime around the Milky Way galaxy—and a “translation 
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3 feet East” is represented by a diffeomorphism 휓 ∶ M → M , which drags along 
the metric to produce a new model, (M,휓∗gab) . This model is isometric to the first, 
“retaining all the relations between bodies” in the sense of test particles. But a sub-
stantivalist, according to Earman and Norton, will say that (M,휓∗gab) and (M, gab) 
cannot both accurately represent the same physical situation at once. That is: sub-
stantivalists must deny Leibniz Equivalence.
Why can’t the substantivalist take (M,휓∗gab) and (M, gab) to represent the same 
thing at once? Because (Earman and Norton argue) they are committed to a “real-
ist view” of the manifold M. In particular: to represent the same thing at once, both 
(M,휓∗gab) and (M, gab) would be given a single concrete interpretation in which a 
point p ∈ M represents a real physical event in spacetime. For example, let (M, gab) 
be the Schwarzschild solution interpreted to represent our galaxy, and let p be a 
point on the event horizon defined by gab . Then p will not generally be a point on 
the event horizon defined by 휓∗gab . So, the manifold substantivalist will deny that 
(M, gab) and (M,휓
∗gab) represent the same physical facts at once, in spite of the fact 
that they are isometric.
This is perfectly compatible with the claim that these two spacetimes have the 
same representational capacities, in the sense of Weak Leibniz Equivalence. The lat-
ter only implies that we could just as well have chosen (M,휓∗gab) to represent our 
galaxy in the first place. But, once a concrete interpretation of (M, gab) is fixed, then 
a manifold substantivalist cannot at the same time use (M,휓∗gab) to represent the 
same thing unless 휓 ∶ M → M is the identity transformation.
Earman and Norton thus implicitly assume that the manifold substantivalist is 
committed to:
Definition 6 (manifold substantivalism) Two Lorentzian manifolds (M, gab) and 
(M, g̃ab) (with the same manifold M) can be concretely interpreted to represent some 
physical situation at once if and only if gab = g̃ab.
Manifold substantivalism implies the denial of (Strong) Leibniz Equivalence. For, 
although a Lorentzian manifold (M, gab) and its ‘shifted’ counterpart (M,휓
∗gab) are 
isometric, the manifold substantivalist will deny that they represent the same thing 
at once, if (and only if) 휓∗gab ≠ gab . However, it would be wrong to say that the 
most significant implication of the hole argument is to rebuke Leibniz Equivalence 
denial. As we will now see, it is not Leibniz Equivalence denial, but the definition 
of manifold substantivalism above that is the successful target of the hole argument.
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4.2  The Hole Argument
Let (M, gab) be a Lorentzian manifold with a Cauchy surface S and a time orienta-
tion7. Not all Lorentzian manifolds admit a Cauchy surface, but there always exists 
a subregion N ⊆ M around each point such that (N, gab|N) is a Lorentzian manifold 
that does; so, just choose any one of them. Consider an open region U in the future 
domain of dependence of S, sometimes called the hole region. Let 휓 ∶ M → M be 
a diffeomorphism that is not the identity inside U, but which is the identity eve-
rywhere else, as depicted in Fig.  2. The two Lorentzian manifolds (M, gab) and 
(M,휓∗gab) are then said to be related by a hole transformation. They are obviously 
isometric.
Suppose (M, gab) is concretely interpreted to represent some physical situation, 
such as the motion of two test particles. According to manifold substantivalism, it is 
only outside the region U that (M, gab) and (M,휓
∗gab) can be interpreted to represent 
the same physical situation at once—that is, in a single interpretation that identifies 
points in M with physical spacetime points—since that is the only region where 휓 is 
the identity. The problem with this, Earman and Norton point out, is that it leads to 
“radical local indeterminism”. For it means that the two distinct models (M, gab) and 
(M,휓∗gab) can be interpreted as representing the same physical situation on S, but 
different situations in its future domain of dependence. The result is a classic expres-
sion of indeterminism: the present facts do not determine the future.8 Earman and 
Norton interpreted this as a reductio ad absurdum: manifold substantivalism, as it 
is defined above, introduces radical local indeterminism into an otherwise perfectly 
good theory. This, they take it, is an absurdity worthy of rejection.
As it happens, manifold substantivalism also implies the denial of Leibniz Equiv-
alence. Equivalently, accepting Leibniz Equivalence implies the rejection of mani-
fold substantivalism; thus, Norton and Earman write, “[o]f course this radical local 
(M, gab)
S
U
(M, ψ∗gab)
ψ(S)
ψ(U)
ψ
Fig. 2  The hole transformation
7 A Cauchy surface for a Lorentzian manifold (M, gab) is a spacelike hypersurface that is intersected by 
every inextendible timelike and null curve exactly once. A time orientation is a smooth timelike vector 
field, which serves to pick out one or the other light cone lobe as ‘future-directed’ at every point. Every 
Lorentzian manifold with a Cauchy surface can be given a time orientation.
8 The result can be avoided by denying that (M, gab) and (M,휓
∗gab) ever represent the same points in 
physical spacetime, in spite of being isometric; this strategy was defended by Butterfield [4].
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indeterminism can be escaped easily by just accepting Leibniz equivalence” [6, p. 
524]. The intended implication is that, by adopting Leibniz Equivalence, one auto-
matically rejects the problematic assumption of manifold substantivalism. Unfortu-
nately, this suggestion is misleading: we may have independent reason to deny Leib-
niz Equivalence, as I have argued above. However, this does nothing to undermine 
the hole argument. And indeed, in their more careful moments, Earman and Norton 
rely on a more modest and appropriate claim: “the affected... substantivalists must 
deny Leibniz equivalence at least for hole diffeomorphisms, which already is suf-
ficient to yield the dilemmas” [6, p. 522, fn.2]. The situation can be summarised:
This is the central point that I would like to make here: the hole argument says that 
rejecting radical indeterminism leads to the rejection of manifold substantivalism; 
but this says nothing about the status of Leibniz Equivalence. And, as I have argued 
above, Leibniz Equivalence as a general principle can be reasonably rejected on 
independent grounds.
5  Regarding Weatherall’s Critique
Weatherall [27, p. 330] has recently suggested that the hole argument, at least as it 
is presented by Earman and Norton [6], “is based on a misleading use of the math-
ematical formalism of general relativity.” His strategy is to argue that the mathemat-
ics of general relativity does not allow Leibniz Equivalence Denial to be coherently 
formulated: “the fact that such an isometry exists provides the only sense in which 
the two spacetimes are empirically equivalent” [27, p.337]. If true, this would make 
trouble not only for the hole argument, but for my claim that Leibniz Equivalence is 
in general false. In this section, I begin by reviewing Weatherall’s general argument 
strategy in light of the account of Leibniz Equivalence developed above. I then show 
how the counterexamples to Leibniz Equivalence given above introduce a challenge 
for Weatherall as well.
5.1  Leibniz Equivalence as a Background Commitment
Weatherall’s reasoning stems from what he calls a “background commitment”, 
which he proposes to adopt when using mathematics to represent the physical world, 
and which he says leads the hole argument to be “blocked”. This turns out to be 
none other than Leibniz Equivalence, in close to its original form:
“isomorphic mathematical models in physics should be taken to have the 
same representational capacities. By this I mean that if a particular math-
manifold substantivalism
radical indeterminism
Leibniz Equivalence Denial
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ematical model may be used to represent a given physical situation, then 
any isomorphic model may be used to represent that situation equally well.” 
[27, p. 332]
Weatherall applies this background commitment to the hole argument as follows: let 
(M, gab) and (M,휓
∗gab) be isometric Lorentzian manifolds related by a hole transfor-
mation. Then the background commitment implies that,
“for any region R of spacetime that may be adequately represented by some 
region U of (M, gab) , there is a corresponding region Ũ = 𝜓[U] of (M, g̃ab) that 
can represent the same region of spacetime equally well, for all purposes” [27, 
p. 11].
Weatherall’s expression of Leibniz Equivalence contains the ambiguity discussed in 
Sect.  2.1: it could be read as saying that isomorphic structures can represent the 
same thing at once (Strong Leibniz Equivalence), or not necessarily at once (Weak 
Leibniz Equivalence). The strength of Weatherall’s intuitions about the commitment 
suggest that he has in mind ‘Weak’ Leibniz Equivalence, which is the more plausi-
ble principle. But Weak Leibniz Equivalence is irrelevant to the hole argument, as I 
have argued in Sect. 2.2. In contrast, the half-plane (among other examples) shows 
that ‘Strong’ Leibniz Equivalence is false, and therefore does not serve as a plausi-
ble background commitment about general relativity. That is, without further qualifi-
cation, Weatherall’s response to the hole argument faces a dilemma: 
1. Weak option: adopt the potentially plausible principle of Weak Leibniz Equiva-
lence, and make a statement that is irrelevant to the hole argument; or
2. Strong option: adopt the principle of Strong Leibniz Equivalence, which would 
render the hole argument unnecessary, but would be stating something false.
Weatherall and his defenders would seem to endorse an escape from this dilemma 
that proceeds by restricting the scope of Strong Leibniz Equivalennce, through a 
conditional statement analogous to Russell’s escape from the paradoxes of naïve set 
theory. In the next subsection, I will try to clarify this response.
5.2  The Russellian Manoeuvre
Weatherall variously suggests that it would be ignominious to deny Leibniz Equiva-
lence, since this would amount to a “misleading use of the formalism of general 
relativity” (p. 330), a failure to use this formalism “correctly, consistently, and 
according to our best understanding of the mathematics” (p. 330), and a view that 
is not “mathematically natural or philosophically satisfying” (p. 345). This approach 
might generate misgivings that Weatherall is just assuming by force of what he finds 
“philosophically satisfying” the very thing that Earman and Norton tried to establish 
by way of an argument. I would like to interpret these statements more charitably, as 
expressing a conditional assumption of Strong Leibniz Equivalence: if a representa-
tion is adequate, then Strong Leibniz Equivalence must hold. In short,
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or equivalently,
If one believes this conditional, then any representation that fails to satisfy Strong 
Leibniz Equivalence should simply be rejected as an inadequate representation. This 
again renders the hole argument at best irrelevant: manifold substantivalism implies 
the denial of Strong Leibniz Equivalence Denial; combining this with the above, one 
can conclude without further argument that such a representation is inadequate:
This same strategy can be used to weasel out of counterexamples like the half-plane 
of Sect. 3. If a representation’s adequacy requires Strong Leibniz Equivalence, then 
that example shows that a Lorentzian manifold is insufficient to represent the physi-
cal half-plane spacetime. For example, one might demand that the structure doing 
the representing is a Lorentzian manifold (M, gab) together with a preferred global 
coordinate system 휑 ∶ M → ℝ2 . Since this coordinate system is not preserved by 
the translation, in that 휑◦휓
s
(x) ≠ 휑(x) for all x ∈ M , the isomorphism fails, and the 
counterexample to Strong Leibniz Equivalence is avoided.
Fletcher [8] has defended Weatherall through a rejoinder in this spirit. He begins 
by formulating an interpretive principle in the spirit of Weak Leibniz Equiva-
lence, which he calls, Representational Equivalence by Mathematical Equivalence 
(REME): “If two models of a physical theory are mathematically equivalent, then 
they have the same representational capacities” [8, §  2]. Fletcher points out9 that 
this principle by itself does little to avoid the indeterminism arising out of the hole 
argument, just as is argued at length in the discussion above (and in [22]). He fol-
lows this observation with his response, which is to restrict what kinds of properties 
a piece of mathematics can represent:
The error implicit in this concern is the assumption that Lorentzian manifolds, 
as mathematical models, represent all properties of a physical relativistic spa-
cetime (and its “contents”). ... Lorentzian manifolds may not exemplify prop-
erties of the states of affairs they represent, but all the properties they do exem-
plify—those not abstracted away—are the same for isomorphic [Lorentzian] 
manifolds. This is precisely encoded in the mathematical models themselves 
with the interpretation of isomorphic objects in a mathematical category as 
being equivalent as objects in that category. ... So any putative representational 
differences among isormorphic models, such as spacetime point haecceities, is 
Adequate representation ⇒ Strong Leibniz Equivalence
Strong Leibniz Equivalence Denial ⇒ Inadequate representation.
Manifold substanvialism ⇒ Inadequate representation.
9 Fletcher writes: “If two relativistic spacetimes, represented as Lorentzian manifolds, are related by a 
hole transformation, then they are isometric, i.e., related by a map that is an isomorphism in the category 
of Lorentzian manifolds. That means, by REME, that they have the same representational capacities, but 
not necessarily that they must represent the same unique physical state of affairs. Yet if this represented 
state of affairs is not unique, then the problem of indeterminism seems to rise again, forcing one to con-
front a metaphysical dilemma anew.” [8, §5.2]
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not reflected at all in the models themselves as members of category they are 
taken to be—there is no mathematical correlate of those differences definable 
in the category.
Fletcher is demanding that, if it is possible for a Lorentzian manifold to “exemplify” 
some properties—meaning, I take it, to adequately represent them—then those 
properties “are the same” for isometric Lorentzian manifolds. As a result, properties 
like “spacetime point haecceities”, sometimes taken to be associated with substanti-
valism, cannot be adequately represented using a Lorentzian manifold. I take this to 
amount to the same conditional statement of Strong Leibniz Equivalence formulated 
above: if a representation is adequate, then Strong Leibniz Equivalence must hold.
5.3  Trouble for the Russellian Manoeuvre
If one asserts that all adequate representations satisfy Leibniz Equivalence, then I 
agree that these conclusions follow. But, I have given a minimal account of adequate 
representations in Sect.  2.2.1 (following Curiel [5]) that does not require Leibniz 
Equivalence, and according to which the half-plane is a perfectly reasonable rep-
resentation. In contrast, Weatherall does not suggest an argument for his back-
ground commitments, but rather states: “I will not to defend them here. Rather, I 
take them as background commitments that inform the arguments to follow” [27, 
p. 332]. Without such a defence, anyone (like me) who finds Lorentzian manifolds 
to adequately represent the physical half-plane will simply conclude that this new 
background commitment is also false. That is, if an adequate representation fails to 
satisfy Strong Leibniz Equivalence, then the manoeuvre fails:
Thus, the Russellian manoeuvre is subject to a challenge as well: rebuke the half-
plane counterexample on independent grounds, without simply assuming by fiat that 
all adequate representations satisfy Strong Leibniz Equivalence. Or, more directly: 
provide independent reason to think that all adequate representations must satisfy 
Strong Leibniz Equivalence.
The challenge is made difficult by the fact that in the practice of science, repre-
sentations commonly fail to satisfy Strong Leibniz Equivalence. For example, Ein-
stein and Grossman’s original expression of the hole argument in 1913–1914 was 
actually an argument against Strong Leibniz Equivalence [17, §3]. Another coun-
terexample is the half-plane Lorentzian manifold given above. Further counterex-
amples abound: Any two single-element sets are isomorphic to each other; but, one 
can use these sets to represent a black raven, or to represent a white shoe. So, Weak 
Leibniz Equivalence is satisfied, and the sets have the same ‘representational capaci-
ties’. But, one cannot use them both to represent the same thing at once, on pain of 
paradoxes of multiple denotation. And it is this second kind of comparison that is at 
issue in the statement of manifold substantivalism.
In general, Strong Leibniz Equivalence can fail in relativity theory whenever 
Lorentzian manifolds represent the nature of spacetime incompletely. Such exam-
ples are well-known [8, 22]. For example, one cannot always neglect the interaction 
¬(Adequate representation ⇒ Strong Leibniz Equivalence).
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between spacetime and quantum fields, as in the analysis of black hole thermody-
namics. Nevertheless, we often use Lorentzian manifolds to represent such situa-
tions, as Hawking [12, p. 219] did in his famous depiction of an evaporating black 
hole, illustrated here in Figure 3. There is currently still considerable disagreement 
about what such spacetimes represent, for example about whether quantum fields 
evolve unitarily between hypersurfaces [2, 14]. That is, the same Lorentzian mani-
fold (M, gab) can of course represent many different situations! But this should not 
dissuade anyone from the practice of representing spacetime using a Lorentzian 
manifold. We must simply admit that two isometric spacetimes—in this case, the 
very same spacetime—may sometimes be used to represent different physical situa-
tions, depending on what we choose to represent.
A rejoinder could be to argue that in such cases, the category of Lorentzian mani-
folds is not the “adequate” mathematical device for representing spacetime: different 
approaches to quantum gravity will adopt different categories to capture the com-
plete facts about spacetime in a more adequate way, which breaks the isomorphism. 
This response is difficult to square with the fact that, as a matter of practice, we do 
use Lorentzian manifolds to represent such things, and we generally accept that our 
physical descriptions are incomplete. Wigner thought that “laws of nature contain, 
in even their remotest consequences, only a small part of our knowledge of the inan-
imate world” [29, p. 5]. This kind of incompleteness does not prevent us from legiti-
mately representing spacetime using a Lorentzian manifold. More importantly, such 
a response just pushes the problem to one of determining the appropriate category 
for the practice of representing spacetime.
The answer to this problem is not automatic, nor can it be derived mathemati-
cally. How mathematics is used to represent the physical world is defined by human 
experience and human intention. It is this freedom that is responsible for the fact 
Fig. 3  The Lorentzian manifold 
associated with an evaporating 
black hole has many inequiva-
lent interpretations, associated 
with the many current proposals 
for black hole microphysics
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that isometry is not “the only way” for us to determine whether two Lorentzian man-
ifolds can represent the same physical situation at once. Einstein’s use of mathemat-
ics in the early formulation of general relativity violated Leibniz Equivalence. There 
is no a priori reason to prohibit such thinking, or to prohibit the more general prac-
tice of free choice in defining when two mathematical structures represent the same 
situation.
5.4  The Identity Map Argument
Part of Weatherall’s discussion is an observation about the differing equivalence 
relations in play in the hole argument. For completeness, let me now offer a few 
comments on that discussion.
One of the consequences of manifold substantivalism is that, if 휓 ∶ M → M is a 
diffeomorphism, then (M, gab) and (M,휓
∗gab) can represent the same physical situ-
ation at once if and only if 휓∗gab = gab , i.e. when 휓 is an isometry of (M, gab) . But 
the Lorentzian manifolds used in realistic modelling situations do not have non-triv-
ial isometries, which means that 휓 can only be the identity map: 휓(p) = p for all 
p ∈ M . Weatherall refers to this map as 1
M
 , to emphasise that it is the identity ele-
ment in the category of manifolds. So, manifold substantivalism is at least commit-
ted to the view that, in realistic modelling situations, the two spacetimes (M, gab) and 
(M,휓∗gab) can represent the same physical situation at once if and only if they are 
related by the manifold identity map 1
M
 . We might even wish to call this a commit-
ment about ‘physical equivalence’ using 1
M
.
Weatherall argues that this standard of physical equivalence is confused. To 
warm us up to this conclusion, he gives the following ‘warmup exercise’: con-
sider two groups constructed from the set of integers ℤ , denoted by (ℤ,+) and 
(ℤ, +̃) . The binary operation ‘ + ’ of the first group is normal arithmetic addition, 
so that 3 + 5 = 8 , and so on. But the binary operation ‘ ̃+ ’ of the second group is 
arithmetic addition followed by subtraction of 1, so that 3 +̃ 5 = 7 , and in general 
n +̃m = n + m − 1 . The identity element in the first group is 0, while the identity 
element in the second is 1. Suppose someone now cries out, ‘These groups have dif-
ferent identity elements!’ What are we to make of this poor, confused exclamation?
Weatherall replies that, since the two groups are obviously isomorphic, “there is 
no ambiguity regarding the additive identity of the integers”, since after all, “the 
identity element is provably unique for any group” [27, p. 333]. In asserting that 
0 and 1 are different identity elements, the confused exclamation assumed that the 
identity map 1
ℤ
 (defined by 1
ℤ
(n) = n for all n ∈ ℤ ) is a reasonable way to compare 
the two groups. But 1
ℤ
 is not an isomorphism between (ℤ,+) and (ℤ, +̃) , and so “the 
identity map is not the relevant standard of comparison” [27, p. 334].
The general principle that Weatherall proposes is thus: we should be sure to 
adopt an adequate equivalence relation “given by the mathematics used in formulat-
ing those models” [27, p. 331]10. Earman and Norton’s manifold substantivalist is 
10 And again, in his discussion of Newtonian spacetimes: “the relevant standard of equivalence is 
already manifest in the map that relates the structures in the first place” [27, p. 342].
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making an illegitimate step in using the manifold identity 1
M
 to judge the equiva-
lence of (M, gab) and (M,휓
∗gab) , according to this view. These Lorentzian mani-
folds are isomorphic, in the sense of being related by an isometry, even though the 
manifold identity 1
M
 does not describe an isometry between them. Like the confused 
exclamation about the group identity element, the manifold substantivalist exclaims 
that “there is an ambiguity with regard to the value of the metric at a point p ∈ O at 
which the two metrics disagree” [27, p. 337]. The problem, Weatherall says, is: “the 
fact that such an isometry exists provides the only sense in which the two spacetimes 
are empirically equivalent” [27, p. 337]—and thus, “the two Lorentzian manifolds 
agree on the metric at every point—there is no ambiguity, and no indeterminism” 
[27, p. 338].
In a purely mathematical context, I am happy enough to agree to the demand that 
we use group-isomorphism to compare groups, or isometry to compare Lorentzian 
manifolds.11 But that is an agreement about totally linguistic structures, which says 
nothing about when such structures can be used to accurately represent the same 
physical situation at once. A further assumption is needed to restrict what a math-
ematical language represents, such as Weak or Strong Leibniz Equivalence. And, as 
I have argued above, neither principle succeeds in refuting the hole argument, even 
with the Russellian manoeuvre of restricting adequate representations.
This same critique applies to both groups of integers and Lorentzian manifolds. 
For example, suppose we use the integers to label an infinite array of classical par-
ticles set out in physical space. Then it is not at all clear that the groups (ℤ,+) and 
(ℤ, +̃) represent can represent the same thing at once, exactly because (for example) 
they disagree about which label represents the additive identity. The same response 
is available to the defender of the hole argument: isometry alone says nothing about 
whether or not two Lorentzian manifolds can be used to represent the same physical 
situation at once. As a result, the manifold substantivalist’s distinction between them 
is illegitimate not because of a principle of applied mathematics, but because of the 
hole argument.
5.5  An Alternative Brand of Quietism
There is a gentler brand of quietism in the neighbourhood of Weatherall’s view that 
might be worth clarifying. It is an attitude that I myself adopt from time to time, 
and which provides some guidance on how to react to the hole argument. The main 
difference is that this view will be presented as a mere attitude, as opposed to a 
rule restricting the use of mathematical representations. I know of no argument that 
establishes the present view. Some simply take comfort in the gentle, Buddhist-like 
perspective on the philosophy of physics that this attitude provides.
11 That said, the mathematical platonist may disagree, for reasons similar to my concerns here. For the 
platonist, a number like (say) zero may have real existence independently of the human mind, and it is 
this object that we represent using the linguistic symbol 0. For such a platonist, the two groups (ℤ,+) and 
(ℤ, +̃) cannot describe mathematical reality with equal accuracy at once.
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The attitude begins by stating the propositions that we have good evidence to 
believe, in the normal language of science12. For example, we may all agree that 
the region near the galactic centre has the structure of Kerr spacetime. But at this 
point, the attitude refuses all further interpretive claims. Questions like ‘Is the set of 
spacetime points real?’ are passed over silently. In their stead one adopts an attitude 
of quietism as far as the propositions of realism about unobservables are concerned.
I take this to capture a sense of what Arthur Fine has called the Natural Ontologi-
cal Attitude (NOA), which he summarises as the recommendation to “try to take sci-
ence on its own terms, and try not to read things into science” [7, p. 149]. This per-
spective can be helpful, and indeed I often find myself joining its practitioners in the 
monastery for a little peace of mind. However, there is no use pretending that this 
view is established by any rigorous argument or rule, as Fine is quick to point out:
It does not comprise a doctrine, nor does it set a philosophical agenda. At most 
it orients us somewhat on how to pursue problems of interest, promoting some 
issues relative to others just because they more clearly connect with science 
itself. Such a redirection is exactly what we want and expect from an attitude, 
which is all that NOA advertises itself as being. [7, p. 10].
The NOA attitude toward manifold substantivalism, I take it, is often an exercise in 
the discipline of silence.
However, the hole argument is not necessarily a case where this attitude is appro-
priate. The argument itself identifies an interesting connection between the realism 
debate and philosophy of science, in establishing a link between manifold substanti-
valism and indeterminism. It has also promoted interesting connections between the 
realism debate and modern physics in helping to motivate a relationist perspective 
on spacetime in quantum gravity [1, 15, 23] as well as sophisticated substantival-
ist alternatives [e.g. 19]. These commentators did not simply fail to “recognize the 
mathematical significance of an isomorphism”[27, p. 339 fn. 22]. On the contrary, 
with too much quietism you may miss out on some of the fun.
6  Conclusion
Leibniz Equivalence is not as clear as it might first seem. Its plausibility depends on 
whether we take two isomorphic mathematical structures to be capable of represent-
ing the same physical situation ‘at once’. If not necessarily (Weak Leibniz Equiva-
lence), then the principle expresses something plausible about the representational 
capacities of those structures, but which is irrelevant to the hole argument. If so 
(Strong Leibniz Equivalence), then the principle is false by explicit counterexam-
ple. Fortunately, this by itself does not threaten the hole argument, which targets a 
more specific statement of manifold substantivalism. But, it does threaten the argu-
ment of Weatherall and others who have defended a version of Leibniz Equivalence. 
I have argued Weak Leibniz Equivalence is irrelevant to the hole argument, and 
12 This is akin to what Ruetsche [24, §1] refers to as a partial interpretation of a theory.
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Strong Leibniz Equivalence is false. And, although one might try to save the latter 
by demanding that it only fails in inadequate representations, I have argued that this 
goes against the ordinary practice of science.
Thus, in spite of some recent threats, Earman and Norton’s hole argument 
remains: one pays a high price for a belief in manifold substantivalism. To that, 
I would now add: the price may be no less for unwarranted principles of applied 
mathematics.
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